Pushing the Boundaries in Northern Ireland: Young People, Violence and Sectarianism

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They want to know if you’re a Protestant or a Catholic. And if you’re in the wrong area, like, that’s you hammered. You might as well book your hospital place now. (Neville, 1998)

1. Introduction

*The Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’*

The conflict in Northern Ireland, euphemistically known as the ‘Troubles’, has since 1969, claimed more than 3,500 lives, representing approximately one in every 500 of the population (1.6 million). Forty thousand people, about one in fifty, have been seriously injured (NISRA, 1998; O’Leary and McGarry, 1993) and it is said that everyone in Northern Ireland has known a friend or relative killed. Young people (under 29 years) account for over half of the total deaths (Cost of the Troubles Study, 1999), and 91.1% of all victims have been male (Smyth and Hamilton, 2003). As well as gender, other factors including location, religion, age, and socio-economic status have had significant influence in how people have experienced and been effected by the Troubles (Fay et al., 1999; Muldoon and Trew, 2000).

The paramilitary cease-fires in 1994 saw a dramatic reduction in the level of ‘political’ violence in Northern Ireland. While these cease-fires have not been ‘complete,’ paramilitary and sectarian violence has since then been linked largely to dissident groups, to internal paramilitary feuds, to paramilitary community ‘policing’ activity, and to localised interface violence (between communities sharing a territorial border). The ceasefires have not brought an end to sectarian or paramilitary violence. Since 1995, 144 people have been murdered, and 834 ‘paramilitary style attacks’ have been reported (528 carried out by loyalist paramilitaries and 306 by republican paramilitaries) (PSNI Statistics, [www.psni.com](http://www.psni.com), August 2003).

Much has been written about the effects of the ‘Troubles’ on young people growing up in Northern Ireland. The physical, social and psychological effects have been recorded and discussed across many different disciplines. Early studies by local psychiatrists and psychologists explored the effect of the political violence on the mental health of children and adults. These studies drew few links between exposure to political violence and increased psychological or psychiatric problems. Heskin’s review of the area pointed towards the seeming resilience of children and young people in Northern Ireland to conflict (Heskin, 1980), but highlighted the concern raised by many at that time about a possible future increase in anti-social behaviour among young people grown used to civil unrest. This familiarity has been found to affect children’s social representation of the world and their visions of the future (Majhoub et al., 1989; Assal and Farrel, 1992). A review of the research in this area suggests that children exposed to political violence are more pessimistic about their future and their opportunities therein (Cairns, 1996). Further studies, and recent reviews (Muldoon, Trew and Kilpatrick, 2000) have also questioned the effect of the troubles on emotional health and wellbeing. There is no conclusive evidence from these studies to suggest that the ‘Troubles’ have contributed to increased levels of depression or anxiety among children and young people.

*Divided communities*

As well as the high cost in human lives, the ‘Troubles’ have served to accentuate differences between the two main Catholic and Protestant communities and have contributed to increased segregation through widespread population shifts. Residential segregation has been a feature of life in Northern Ireland since the beginning of the ‘Troubles’ (and before), with ongoing movement and displacement, and has contributed to a situation where it is estimated that 50% of the population live in areas that are more than 90% Catholic or Protestant (Smyth, 1998). A recent public housing body report states that almost 100% of tenants in Belfast live in segregated areas, while across the whole of Northern Ireland the figure is 71% (Northern Ireland Housing Executive, 1999: 22). It is worth noting that this level of segregation is most
Acutely observed in urban areas (Boole, 1982), but as Murtagh (2003) illustrates in his study in rural areas, segregation is a feature of life across the province.

As a result of population shifts over the years therefore, a significant number of young people live in segregated areas. This segregation extends beyond their housing experience. They are educated in schools that are not only segregated on religious grounds (excepting the small minority who attend integrated school), but also on ability and class, as decided by the 11 plus transfer exam system (under review, Burns, 2001). Social and leisure activity is also significantly influenced by the lines of segregation established in home and school. For many first opportunities for sustained contact with ‘the other side’ may only come at third level education or first employment experiences.

**Community and social capital**

Social capital is a concept that is widely used across disciplines, and within political discourse, to theorise the processes that operate within communities from the local to the global. It facilitates debate on how aspects of communities such as social relationships, values, norms and networks, can generate and contribute to advancement of shared goals and wellbeing of communities. It has been summarised as ‘the values that people hold and the resources they can access, which both result in, and are the result of, collective and negotiated ties and relationships’ (Edwards, Franklin and Holland, 2003).

The development of social capital theory has reflected the individual social and academic interests of particular theorists such as Bourdieu, Coleman, Putnam, Molyneux and Fukuyama. It is a concept that has been used and applied across a range of disciplines, producing three broad themes. The first of these links the breakdown of traditional family forms and changing social relations with a general fragmentation in social capital (Putnam 1995; Coleman 1997). The second sees these changes in a more positive light and as creating the potential for social capital to be generated in different ways and to flow through other channels than in earlier formulations (Giddens, 1992; Weeks, 1995). The third takes a more cautious stance on the issue of change, arguing that continuity in patterns of social institutions and relations is more substantial than change, and that structural features of life based on social class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, age, disability still shape forms of social capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Molyneux, 2001).

The family is regarded as a vital conduit of social capital, and is placed centre stage by Coleman in his conceptualisation of social capital. Social capital is regarded by Coleman and Putnam as a resource within ‘the family’ that inheres in the structure of intergenerational relationships, especially between parents and children. This process of social capital generation within families integrally links to social capital as a resource outside ‘the family’, where parents and children are embedded in close, local relationships. Relations between parent and child and social ties outside the family come together to create a dense social structure of norms, extensive trust and obligations, which Coleman calls ‘intergenerational closure’ (Edwards et al., 2003). For Coleman, this ‘intergenerational closure’ is threatened by patterns of modern market-led consumption such as generation specific leisure activities and youth oriented mass media, all of which, he argues, create a youth culture which leads young people away from parent-generated norms and so undermines social capital generation (Coleman, 1991).

The two main communities in Northern Ireland can be seen as generating both positive and negative social capital for those who live within them. The social networks and support within them provide considerable bonding social capital (Putnam, 1998), the type of social capital that binds communities together. Putnam, for example, characterises the bonding form of social capital as based on homogeneous ties of solidarity between ‘people like us’, inward-looking, reinforcing exclusive identities, and restricted to enabling people to ‘get by’. He argues that this is a limiting type of social capital that does not facilitate movement of individuals in terms of both geographical and social mobility. Bridging social capital can link people across...
communities, and across structural groupings such as class, gender and ethnicity, enabling people to ‘get ahead’ in life and foster social inclusion. Communities within Northern Ireland display high levels of intra-community trust and localised networking associated with ‘bonding’ social capital. These communities are traditionally anchored by and identified with faith-based institutions. While the generation of social capital within these subcultures is of vital importance and value, it is often developed at the expense of broader community development and can undermine conditions that are associated with ‘bridging’ social capital. Bridging social capital is not as easily available in the tightly knit and closed sectarian communities of Northern Ireland. Additionally, in such communities negative social capital can also be produced, placing further limits on movement beyond community boundaries.

Through the use of case study data, this paper looks at how the experience and fear of sectarianism and violence has shaped young people’s responses to life in a way that either binds them into the status quo, and the benefits and restrictions this has to offer, or allows them to move beyond the bounded – a journey of both loss and gain. The paper considers the influence of gender and class on the type and processes of social capital available to and used by young people on such journeys, and explores the success of institutional and informal strategies and interventions, born out of a need to survive and manage conflict and diversity.

Processes of social change, detraditionalisation and globalisation, are evident as some try to move beyond the lived history of their parents’ generation to spaces that are defined more by consumption and leisure than religion and politics, and where boundaries are more easily traversed.

2. Youth Values and Transitions to Adulthood – a Northern Ireland Dimension

Northern Ireland is one of five sites across the UK involved in three linked studies over the past seven years. These are *Youth values: identity, diversity and social change* (1997 to 1999); *Inventing adulthoods: young people’s strategies for transition* (1999-2001); and *Youth transitions and social change* (2002-2006). The young people in Northern Ireland who have participated in the projects come from one geographical area but are drawn from different religious and cultural backgrounds. They come from an area that boasts the youngest population in Europe, with 24% under the age of 15. Current unemployment for the 18-24 year age bracket is 10.8% (Department of Enterprise Trade and Investment, 2003) and the main employment in the area is within the public sector. The research participants are mixed in terms of gender, class and religious background and were, at the outset, drawn primarily from four schools - a Catholic maintained school, a neighbouring Controlled school (majority Protestant), an integrated school, and a Controlled school attended by both communities. (A small number were accessed out of school.) At the start of the project they ranged in age from 11 to 19 years, and are currently 18 to 26 years.

The data collection for the three related projects, which this paper draws on, coincided with significant developments and crises in the ‘peace process’. It was carried out against the backdrop of paramilitary cease-fires (1994) and their collapse (1996), ongoing political talks, sectarian murder atrocities, reinstated cease-fires (1997), the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement (1998), the setting up of new political government bodies (1999), and their subsequent suspension (2002). The political landscape had shifted more dramatically in these recent years than in the past three decades. For some these changes amount to new hope and optimism, while for others they intensify feelings of distrust and uncertainty. The longitudinal

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1 Seventeen hundred young people across the five research sites took part in a questionnaire in 1997; 847 of these were in Northern Ireland (476 males, 371 females). 121 young people in the Northern Ireland site took part in 24 focus group interviews and 22 in individual interviews. The *Inventing adulthoods* project continued to interview up to 40 of these young people over three rounds. Thirty young people from Northern Ireland are currently involved in the project.
biographical approach employed in this study allows us to record some of these feelings and responses, and to observe the influence of ethnicity, gender and class on the processes.

At the end of the current phase of the study the young people will have been involved in the research over a nine-year period. Various methods of data collection and analysis have been used in that time (Thomson and Holland, 2003). As well as taking part in regular interviews some of the young people have kept memory books (Thomson and Holland, forthcoming), have been involved in class work exercises, and taken part in focus groups to discuss emerging themes from the study. The table below summarises the timeframes and methods employed:

**Figure 1. The studies – time frames and methods (total sample figures)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Study/Phase</th>
<th>Methods</th>
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| 1996-1999  | Youth values: identity, diversity and social change (also known as Respect)                     | Questionnaires n=1727  
Focus Groups n = 56  
1:1 interviews n =50 |
| 1999-2002  | Inventing adulthoods: young people’s strategies for transition (also known as Fast Forward or FF) | Three in-depth 1:1 interviews 9 monthly intervals. (ff1, ff2, ff3)       |
| 2002-2006  | Youth transitions and social change (FF)                                                       | Two in-depth interviews 18 months apart. (ff4, ff5)                     |

The place of violence and the effect of the 'Troubles' were specifically accessed in the Youth values study in relation to young people's values and attitudes, both in a questionnaire and in subsequent focus group interviews. These topics emerged more generally, and less often, in subsequent individual interviews. The recent increase in urban street violence and non-sectarian attacks were reflected in the Inventing adulthoods and Youth transitions data. Young people’s experiences of and responses to this type of violence are also included in this paper. In this paper data is included from focus group and individual interviews carried out as part of the Youth values study, and from the three rounds of individual interviews completed between 1999 and 2002 on the Inventing adulthoods project. A further round of individual interviews has just been completed as part of the Youth transitions project but has not been fully analysed.

3. Experiences of Violence

Until the cease-fires of 1994, the young people in this study knew only of life set against the backdrop of conflict and political violence, having lived their childhood and teenage years in the late 1980s and 1990s. The level and intensity of violence has varied over the years, and young people’s exposure and response to it has been affected by a number of factors including location, gender, age, and class. Some of the young people in this study have grown up in areas of relatively high conflict. Others have had little if any direct personal experience of violence as a result of the political conflict, but almost all have had intimate knowledge of how their ‘community’, or older relatives, parents, grandparents, and other family members had in the past suffered and been affected. This knowledge was internalised, and some assumed the hurt of a past experience on a very personal level. Such history was often used to explain and to justify their own, and others’, feelings, behaviour and attitudes. For some, this history led to what the young people described as ‘bitterness’ and a continued distrust and suspicion of the ‘other’ community. For others, it emphasised the futility of the ongoing conflict and a desire to disassociate or escape from such division. Past hurts and losses gave legitimacy to anger and ‘bitterness’ but could also act as a catalyst for action and change.
Violent histories

Why so many young people have been prepared to ‘inherit the mantle of their parents’ culture’ is a question that Bell has asked in his study of youth culture and sectarianism in the 1980s (Bell, 1987). His study focussed on loyalist youth culture, and found that young working class Protestant men were involved in processes that sustained ethnic identity and contributed to ‘territorial demarcation and defence’. Involvement in loyalist marching bands was an important part of these processes. While Bell was only concerned with young men growing up within loyalist communities, similar processes are evidently at work within republican communities. Data from the Youth values and Inventing adulthoods studies support Bell’s findings in this regard. Results from the questionnaire indicated that young people in Northern Ireland were more likely to condone the use of political violence than their English counterparts, and within the Northern Ireland sample, young men from working class backgrounds were most likely to condone it (McGrellis et al., 2000). However, the longitudinal and qualitative aspect of this study highlights the shifts and movements over time in young people’s attitudes towards violence and its role in the upkeep of bounded spaces, and defence of cultural traditions.

Getting involved in paramilitary activity and sectarian violence has, for many, been a reality of growing up in Northern Ireland over the recent past, particularly for young men from working class backgrounds (Reilly et al., forthcoming). The pressure from peers and communities, from history, has for some been too great to withstand. In his study of young men and violence in Northern Ireland, Crozier lists ‘pride, image, self-esteem, risk-taking and group identity’ as some of the factors linking young men and their involvement in violence (Crozier, 2001). Many young people in our study showed an acute awareness of the processes and circumstances that can lead to involvement in sectarian and paramilitary activity, as well as an awareness of the processes that can protect against such involvement.

Family background is often influential in shaping political views and aspirations. Some young people reflected how their upbringing in families with strong republican or loyalist sympathies and histories has affected their experience of and attitude to the use of violence. Liam’s somewhat confused and contradictory discussion perhaps best illustrates how challenging it is for young people to reconcile historical political narratives, as established and received through family experience and stories, with personal aspirations for change and a more ‘normal’ future. Liam talked about how, as young adults, his father and uncles were actively involved in the Troubles. He tells how he too in turn became involved in street riots and was brought up to believe in the necessity of killing for political ideals, and in the justification of armed conflict. This was part of a focus group discussion that took place in Spring 1998 before the referendum on the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement:

Liam: Well, things, things that I was, I always felt was strong in our house, that em, good discipline and all that, and, and Ireland should be united, and Brits should pull out the ‘morrow, and you should do whatever it takes to get rid of them. If it means murder, well so be it. That’s what I was taught when I was younger, but now I know. I’ve learnt that’s not the way, ‘cause by you going out and killing someone - it’s only over a piece of land, and we’ve seen it and we’ve seen the bombings and the shootings for the last twenty five years and it hasn’t worked, or three hundred years, and it hasn’t worked in three hundred years. I don’t think it’s going to work now. The only way, is try and get on together, whatever the country decides, whatever the majority wants, we’ve just got to go by it. It’s not worth dying over any more. Too many graves full up, so there is, and too many people hurt, too many people lost. [] He (father) was brought up at the age of sixteen years of age, standing in the streets having gun battles with the police, at sixteen. I mean, that influenced him growing up and the way he thought. And one of his brothers was nearly beaten to death by a soldier. (Youth Values, 1998)2

2 Quotations are identified by the project, date and round (ff1, 2 or 3).
Many of the young people, like Liam, mourned the lives and the life that had been lost as a result of the conflict and, like him, made indirect reference to their own feelings of personal loss through their expressed hopes for the next generation:

Liam: Cos I don't want my weans growing up seeing fucking bombs going off and not being able to go out with friends and that there. (Youth Values, 1998)

However despite such aspirations, a significant number of young people subscribed in principle to the need for violence in some situations. The culture of revenge that has, in Northern Ireland, so ruthlessly oiled the cycle of conflict, was a dominant theme in discussions around the role and utility of violence in society.

Continued discussion with Liam illustrates how a rejection of ongoing conflict and a desire for peace, as expressed above, does not necessarily rule out violence as a legitimate form of violence. In the same group discussion Liam finds himself justifying violence. Both he and Joseph give a clear description of the way in which violence breeds violence. The discussion illustrates how violence, and indeed murder, is justified within a discourse of obligation and political idealism. Communities of influence bound by shared values and ideals can generate what Putnam describes as the ‘dark side’ of social capital, whereby the commitment to and pursuit of a shared objective has devastating consequences for those on the ‘outside.’ In his justification Liam makes a distinction between rational and emotional responses; political murder is an act ‘you don’t feel good about’, ‘don’t enjoy’, but is however, something you ‘believe in’, ‘were taught’, are ‘prepared to fight for’, and ultimately regard as ‘right’ and something ‘you have to do’:

Liam: That's the way things are and it's like that and you have to live with it like. I don't agree with going out and shooting someone like. But I know if some bastard shot one of my family, I'd go and do it twice as hard. I'd go out and shoot two.

Joseph: I think it's wrong to use violence in politics -- I'm not trying to say anything about any side -- but people are blaming other people in the wrong and then they're blaming them back for doing something else in the wrong and then violence just erupts through that. []

Liam: Nobody feels good about a political murder. It's because you feel strongly about it - you don't feel good about going in and blowing some boy's head off like. It's just that - not that you feel good about it - just that you see it as right. It's what you believe in and what you were taught and is something you're prepared to fight for. [] You have to - you do it like, but you don't enjoy it anyway. (Youth Values, 1998)

This sense of obligation is linked to family, community and political values and ideals, and is communicated between generations. While strong family and community loyalty is regarded in social capital terms as positive, it can also stifle overall community development. If we consider this through the lens of social capital theory, it is possible to see how the benefits of ‘bonding’ social capital are not only restricted to the life of an homogeneous group, but can also threaten the life of those deemed to be on the outside.

Liam’s story also illustrates the ways in which identities and values are transferred through the actions and beliefs of one generation to the next. Inheriting the mantle of their parents’ culture transfers responsibility to young people and forces them to make choices in different historical circumstances. It is clearly difficult to reject, at whatever level, the values of family and community – to reject what Liam referred to as the ‘the things that [were] strong’ in the home.
The constraining effect of reputations and responsibilities

The things that are ‘strong’ within home and community are often linked to class, and choices and decisions made in relation to these are often affected by gender. The individual narratives of two young men also from working class backgrounds, Dermot and Stuart (discussed at length elsewhere, McGrellis, 2002) fit with those of the young men in Bell’s study. At our first meetings both were seemingly locked into the reproduction of spaces of resistance. Their positions were sustained within these spaces by political discourses, cultural practices, social networks, and shared ideology and hopes, some of the key components of what Routledge (1996) refers to as ‘terrains of resistance’ but which could also be characterised in forms of social and cultural capital.

Both young men were resigned to their role within their respective ‘terrains’ and accepted that violence was part of their deal. Over the course of the project, however, Dermot’s reluctance to inherit this reputation and role clearly increased as he tried to find other acceptable ways of realising his masculinity. His involvement in sports and local youth club activities became central to this end.

His interest in and connection with family and community politics eroded over time to be replaced by apathy and cynicism. At our third meeting, when asked his views on the political process, he stated that he was ‘concerned with that stuff no more’ (ff2, 2000). Similarly his reluctant participation in gang and sectarian violence evident in our first two meetings had been partly replaced at our last, by a preference for dialogue:

Dermot: Oh I just chat to the person who needs all sorted and the person who needs sorted… I don’t need to fight. (ff3, 2001)

The gang, however, remained in the background as a security measure. Dermot clearly felt that his reputation could not be as easily changed when he commented:

Dermot: But if I ever, if you ever needed the gang badly, saying you were in trouble or in a fight in the town or something, the gang would always be there for you like. (ff3, 2001)

The reliance on gangs could be regarded as an indicator of the absence of more alternative social networks and means of influence within Dermot’s life. While his family network is large and influential, and provides considerable resources and protection, this is largely limited to his own community. Outside his identified community, this has little value.

Stuart’s position was remarkably similar at the outset of the study. Like Dermot, his family had strong paramilitary sympathies and, like Dermot, he was a member of a marching band. He had been involved in sectarian riots and his name was well known within his own community but also to the security forces and to his peers in the neighbouring Catholic community. Unfortunately it has been difficult to keep personal contact with Stuart and updates on his life have been received third hand. He apparently continued to take a significant role in loyalist paramilitary and sectarian violence and the most recent news of Stuart was of his imprisonment for involvement in paramilitary activity.

The version of masculinity to which both these young men, and many others, subscribe can lock them into a trajectory in which a sense of place and all that it demands overrides personal agency. In Dermot’s case, other resources such as sport became important over time in allowing him to access other spaces and identities, from those in which he felt so firmly entrapped in our first interview with him:
Dermot: And just because of my name they all want to batter me. Then if I hadn't got that name, if I was brought up somewhere else I wouldn’t be wile into violence (Youth Values, 1998)

Within their communities these young men were respected and afforded responsibility and status that depended on their willingness to use and accept violence. The networks that they were part of and which supported their positions were based on a common set of values and beliefs, and subscribed to what Evans (1997) referred to in her study of a Salford community as the ‘neighbourhood dogma’. Their reputation and position within their communities was both empowering but restrictive in the broader sense. This embeddedness has led Stuart into prison and Dermot, although less willing to take a role supported by violence, to be very much confined to his own geographical and confessional area, and reluctantly dependent on the security and protection of gang violence.

**Rough justice**

The authority that individuals and families, such as Dermot’s and Stuart’s, have within their communities lies in contrast to that held by state sources. In Northern Ireland, the security forces are viewed by sections of both communities with hostility and distrust. This lack of trust has undermined the credibility of policing and afforded others, particularly paramilitary groups, the authority to police their own communities. This alternative form of social control is largely based on the use or threat of violence. Paramilitary vigilantism has been a part of life in Northern Ireland since the beginning of the Troubles and has left over 115 people dead and more than 4000 injured (Silke, 2000). In focus group discussions in 1998, young people, particularly from Catholic working class backgrounds, wrestled with the rights and wrongs of paramilitary policing and punishment attacks. Opinion was divided. It was clearly a difficult dilemma, where young people had little confidence in the police force to deal with anti social behaviour in their communities but found it hard to reconcile the methods used by paramilitaries.

Dermot acknowledged the need for this type of ‘justice’ and admitted that he himself deserved, but because of family connections escaped, a paramilitary punishment for anti-social activity - an example of both the protective value and dark side of bonding social capital:

Dermot: [] because when I was a hood I didn’t think I would have got off a punishment beating because me da and his brothers would have got it sorted out for me, they would have said to the rest of the Republicans or whatever ‘We’ll sort it out from here’ - and then they would have just talked to me about it and all. And then the other ones would get a hiding because they would have nobody to say for them ‘uns. (Youth Values, 1998)

Other young men from both communities talked about how they were ‘policed’ by paramilitaries in their own communities:

Malcolm: [] Paramilitaries were coming in and they were stopping you doing things
INT: Like what?
Malcolm: Like we were sitting at a bus stop and the bus, like singing and all, and we were only joking with each other. They say we have to stay away from the bus stop or whatever. They threatened us and all. (ff1, 1999)

While the young people were scathing about these groups, they were nevertheless intimidated by them and responded to their threats, wanting, as one young man put it, ‘(to keep) their kneecaps’.
Redressing the balance of authority held by the security forces and paramilitary groups in local communities is not an easy task. Paramilitary vigilantism is regarded by many as an effective way of maintaining order within confessional communities. Many, like Cynthia below, felt secure in the knowledge that her area, which she described as ‘purely Protestant’, was, as she saw it, cleansed of anti-social behaviour through this type of policing:

Cynthia: You feel a lot more protected and everything and I mean like there’s people that kinda run the estate and [] eh you feel a lot better because they watch out for families if there’s drugs. I mean you’re not allowed to do drugs in the street. If you do drugs in the street, you’re out. If you’re.. eh ..if .. like if you’re a bad seed you’re out. (ff3, 2001)

Protection within communities at this level demands an unequivocal investment in and commitment to the dominant culture and the traditions, rules and codes of practices, reinforcing the ‘neighbourhood dogma’ mentioned above. Perhaps one of the most crucial of these rules is that of community loyalty and not ‘grassing’. This was a value held high by the young people, where the need to subscribe to and invest in local culture was also evident (McGrellis et al., 2000).

The lack of trust in official bodies can also undermine the development of positive social capital within the wider community and perpetuates the growth of destructive practices such as vigilantism. Liam’s lack of trust in the police allowed him to rationalise and legitimatise the practice of responding to violence with violence and ‘to take the law into [his] own hands’:

Liam: In this town people say you shouldn’t take the law into your own hands, but sometimes you’ve got no fucking choice ’cos in this town there’s no such thing as the law. You know what the police are like in this town - they’re useless. You go down the town some night and you get a kicking, you get a hiding, you go to the police and report the hiding right, instead of taking the law into your own hands, you say right I’ll do the right thing, and you go to the police to report it. They more or less turn their nose up at you and say ‘go away, we can’t deal with that there’ and then so you say, ‘well oh fuck, I went to the law and they decided they’re not going to do anything with it so I will take the law into my own hands now, sometimes you’re left with no choice. (Youth Values, 1998)

In this extract there is also a strong sense of how young people like Liam have begun to recognize the anomalous nature of their situation, and the fact that what happens in ‘this town’ is somehow particular to it. Within group and individual discussions young people made reference to the peculiarity of the codes of life that they subscribed to. This increased awareness of the specificity of their situation was, for some, linked to a desire to move beyond its restrictions. Increased geographical movement, both into and out of the country, and the advances of a global culture have clearly contributed to a situation where some young people are reluctant to normalise the abnormal, in a way that perhaps previous generations did.

It is ironic that a forced expulsion by a paramilitary group gave one young man in the study the opportunity to experience life beyond his local community first hand, to observe its limitations, and to question what he himself subscribed to as normal.

Following a violent incident, Adrian was given hours, by the paramilitaries, to pack his bag and leave the country\(^3\). For him, this type of ‘policing’ was normal; he accepted it in the same way he accepted the need for punishment beatings and shootings meted out to those engaged in anti-social behaviour, such as so-called ‘joyriding’ or drug dealing. Adrian’s forced exclusion, from family and community, constituted his

\(^3\) He was subsequently cleared by the courts of any wrong doing.
‘punishment’ but also ensured his well being. His experience of both types of justice (police and paramilitary) made him re-evaluate his opinions:

Adrian: I had no faith at all in the police, but now whenever I think about it and you’re involved through the IRA, like, at least then you think, well, you know what I mean - I’ve more faith in the police now than which I did when I was younger. (ff1, 1999)

At his most recent interview (2003), Adrian reflected that being forced out had in fact worked to his advantage. He completed his training and education, and established himself within a strong social and work network. Most significantly, this experience has shifted his perspective and attitudes with regard to the political conflict and sectarianism. Despite his freedom to do so, he has no plans to return to Northern Ireland on a long-term basis. Access to key forms of social capital, in the shape family and community networks in England, buffered the effects of this critical moment (Thomson et al., 2002) and ensured a positive transitional step and outcome for him.

4. Strategies and Tactics

Getting out and moving on

Many young people in the study believed that ‘getting out’ was the only way to move on. In a Northern Irish context, religion, class and gender are significant interacting determinants of what ‘moving on’ means. Whether young people make it ‘out’, or remain bound to polarised identities, can be linked to different circumstances, to different forms of social capital and to the strategies they use to negotiate their pathway.

Corine is a young Catholic woman from a working class background who lives in a predominately Protestant but contentious area. The presence and threat of violence in the community coloured her experience and expectations of life. While she had friends from different traditions in her area, her friendships with her Protestant peers were often tested and challenged. This was particularly so at times of high tension such as the summer marching season, when friendships became cooler and she was at times subjected to sectarian verbal abuse. A petrol bomb attack on her grandparent’s home called her commitment to integration into question and resurrected family grievances and past histories:

Corine: Aye, I do hope that it [peace process] does work - like, I really - I’ve been like good friends with Protestants, my best friend’s a Protestant, and if everyone got on the way we got on, you know, it would be class so it would. [ ] You know, like I don't want - see my mammy said I don’t want yous ones having to grow up the way we had to grow up. My daddy, like, he grew up in a Protestant area, and he got his windows and all put through all the time. And he’s wile bitter like - and I don’t want to be bitter like him, and he would say things to me ‘tch you sitting down there with scum’ and all that there. But that’s only because of the things that they do, you know towards me or towards my family. Like, my granny, her house got petrol bombed, a couple of months ago. And I was really annoyed with that there, really hated them. I - I don't know why, I didn't hate all of them, I just hated the ones I thought it was. [ ] It was too close to home, that kind of thing. I never expected it to happen [ ] I didn't get wile bitter - I just became - sorta went – ‘I can't believe they done that here to my granny’s’. (Youth Values, 1998)

Corine’s conflicting loyalties to family and friends pulled her in opposite, and seemingly incompatible directions. Over the course of a year she came to the conclusion that it would be better if her family moved
out of the area. Her main worry was for the safety of her teenage brother, who she believed was at increasing risk of sectarian attack:

Corine: (I want to move) up to a more private, quieter area, if you know what I mean?
INT: Right.
Corine: You know like X place or something, you know, more Catholic too a bit.
INT: Right, are you getting into trouble being in (current home area)?
Corine: Nah. Did I tell you my granny's got petrol bombed last year?
INT: Aye you were saying that.
Corine: Nah. Just, it's not like that there, it's just if we don't my wee brother's getting to the age where ones is going to be saying this or whatever. And like it's harder for a wee fella, it's not hard for wee girls. Like it's hard for wee girls, but wee fellas it's different. (ff1, 1999)

Reputations, allegiances and identities are public knowledge within working class communities such as Corine’s, and are often both violently upheld and assaulted. Corine recognised that the implications of such public reputations are hard to escape, particularly for young men, and she aspired to the safety of a more ‘private’ space where sectarianism and paramilitarism are perceived to be less pervasive. Her desire to live in a more homogeneous (Catholic) area is indicative of a need to connect with others who share similar values and beliefs and with whom there is a shared trust. This desire encapsulates both the positive and negative aspects of bonding social capital whereby community cohesion is reinforced as social exclusion is legitimatised.

Such a move had not materialised for Corine or her family at our last meeting (2003). However, in its absence, other channels of escape were being pursued over time. Corine and her parents regarded education as a ‘way out’ both for her and her brother. They saw it as an opportunity to become socially mobile, an opportunity that they themselves did not have, and a chance for their children to avoid ‘growing up the way they had to grow up’. In our second meeting, Corine had talked about her plans to go to university in England. She wanted to experience an alternative way of life. Education provided access to this alternative life, and while Corine didn’t follow up on her plans to move to England, she is currently studying at university in Northern Ireland and is very much focussed on her future career and a world beyond her immediate locality. She is also accessing new sources of social and cultural capital through her university and work life – representing tentative, but potentially more inclusive bridging social capital.

Contemplating and making moves beyond tight knit communities is not easy, as attested by both Corine and other young people in the study. For those whose social capital is restricted, and inwardly directed to the maintenance of the communities in which they live and to the boundaries that define them, moving on can be a daunting and risky prospect.

Corine’s hope to avoid the position of bitterness that her father has evidently become locked into, is tested by sectarian assaults from within her own community. This internal strife has made the psychological, if not geographical, distancing from her community easier. The lack of homogeneity in communities such as hers leaves it exposed to attack from within, shattering trust and so undermining the very core of social capital. Trust within homogeneous communities in Northern Ireland has facilitated high levels of social cohesion and intra-community development, while a lack of trust and suspicion between the two main communities has perhaps frustrated overall social, economic and cultural development. In the absence of trust between the two main communities, engagement with the ‘other’ side can often be hesitant. For many young people, open and honest encounters can be less common than those that depend on the use of protective strategies and tactics as described below.
Recognising the other

At the most basic level of self-protection, young people use information and markers available to the trained and practised eye to read situations and people and to respond accordingly. They see themselves, and others, as ethnically identifiable and therefore potentially exposed and at risk in certain environments.

Young people from both communities talked about these identifying markers that include: accent, mannerisms, dress codes, social style, hair colour, and ‘the look’:

Allan: You know by the look of Catholics and you know by the look of Protestants.
Dougie: There’s one in first year.
Natalie: There’s Catholic teachers in this school; you can tell by the way they go on.
Dougie: You can tell Mr X.
Natalie: Aye, You can tell Mr X a mile away. He’s a Catholic.
INT: I just wouldn’t know how you would do that. Is it something you learn from when you are young?
Dougie: Mmm.
Allan: It’s hard enough sometimes to spot one.
Stuart: You know by the way they speak as well.
INT: Yeah? Accents?
Stuart: They speak like, you know, Irish.
Natalie: No, not necessarily, not necessarily the case though. (Youth Values, 1998)

Research in this area has found that by age 11 children are able to discriminate between stereotypical Catholic and Protestants names (Cairns 1980). Stringer (1984, cited in Connolly, 1999) found that adults had no hesitation in correctly discriminating between photographs of ‘stereotypical Catholic and Protestant faces’, and at 10 years children were developing the same discriminatory skills.

In the extract below one young woman expressed surprise at the researcher’s failure to pick up on ‘style’ differences between young Catholics and Protestants. In the absence of any obvious racial or ethnic differences, aesthetic markers such as these are used as defining and labelling:

Cheryl: Do you not think there is a big difference even in the way we talk, and the way we dress is completely different?
INT: The way you dress?
Cheryl: Aye did you never notice that?
INT: No, not dress, no.
Cheryl: There is in certain age groups like. Not in our age group, the going out age group, but in like 16 year olds they wear big flared trousers and all whereas the (Protestant area) don’t wear that. Did you never notice that?
INT: What do the (Protestant area) wear?
Cheryl: Just some sort of jeans, ordinary jeans and all, whereas people from over the town wear big massive flared trousers and would be a more hippy sort of style. But people from over here are different. Did you never notice that?
INT: I noticed the kind of hippy style that everybody seems to be wearing but I never noticed that it’s not been worn here.
Cheryl: No it’s not, it’s definitely not worn in the (Protestant area) so it’s not.
INT: So they talk differently and dress differently and socialise differently. (ff3, 2001)
It is ironic that while young people from both communities make significant efforts to disguise their identity for safety, at the same time they invest considerable energy in constructing identities around visibly distinguishing markers. Globally defined youth cultural fashions have become incorporated into ethnically specific signifiers in Northern Ireland. Subtleties of style and affect have become embedded within the culture of sectarianism.

These more subtle indicators are called on and used by some to carry out sectarian attacks. As such, the vulnerability young people feel with regard to their identity was a common theme:

Ella: But there are people up the town looking for fights. They walk around looking for fights. But there is people who used to batter Protestants – they know by looking at them if they’re Protestant or Catholic. I’ve been talking to boys that know straight away if they’re Protestant, they just know by looking at them. They think red hair is a sign of Protestants, that’s what they think [laughter]. They’re all mad. (Youth Values, 1998)

The young man below emphasises the point made by others in recounting his own experience of being ‘spotted’ as a Protestant in a space beyond the protective boundaries of his own community:

Allan: One time I was over town, I was over on my own, I wasn’t getting anything, just walking around. A couple of boys came up to me and said - You’re a Jaffa, get out. So I just cleared to the house. (ff1, 1999)

The fear of being identified as the ‘other’, as an ‘outsider’ in unfriendly spaces, limits young people’s movement and ultimately their opportunities and choices:

Dougie: I’d want to live with my own kind. (Youth Values, 1998)

Some, however, were clearly determined to overcome these restrictions. On a day-to-day basis, consciously and subconsciously, they employed various strategies and tactics to minimise their exposure to violence and their risk of sectarian assault. Shuttleworth and colleagues (2000) refer to similar techniques in their study of violence and spatiality as ‘behaviour regulation and coping strategies’. De Certau (1984) makes the distinction between strategies and tactics, and suggests that strategies are informed by power and have both a starting and finishing point. Tactics on the other hand are employed by those without power, and have limited benefit. Practices employed for personal safety and identity management may be no more than what De Certau refers to as ‘tactics.’

Negotiating the boundaries

As outlined above, young people use basic skills of identifying the ‘other’, reading situations in order to stay safe. At the most fundamental level an observance of, if not a respect for, divided and marked territories, was regarded as a basic necessity to reduce the risk of assault. Young men and women told how they avoided, or negotiated access, to certain areas and localities. The fact that the commercial and entertainment heart of this city is located in a space deemed to ‘belong’ to only one section of the community means that many of the young people from a Protestant background did not feel safe to freely shop or socialise there. As well as a fear of sectarian violence, the increase in city centre crime and assaults (see below) also deterred many, particularly at night. Some young people avoided this area and the facilities therein completely:

Ruth: I wouldn’t dare go over there.
INT: You wouldn’t dare?
Ruth: I wouldn’t be allowed anyway. You know my mum would be very cautious of over - once you go over [there], you know, more bother and fighting and all especially cause I’m a Protestant, you know the way - you’re not really took to too kindly over there. (ff2, 2000)

Others choose particularly quiet times to do their shopping for example, ‘in the morning when there’s not many people about’ (ff3, 2001) or alternatively sent messengers to do it for them, ‘I send my ma over to get my clothes and all’ (ff2, 2000).

The benefit of such tactics may be pure survival, and their use is linked to a perceived sense of lack of belonging and risk. The need to ‘keep your head down’, to ‘keep your mouth shut’, to ‘say nothing’, ‘to say nothing to offend another religion’, was repeatedly emphasised by the young people in the study when talking about their daily living experience. The culture of silence and secrecy is a commonly observed aspect of political culture at all levels in Northern Ireland (Smyth, 1996). It is regarded by Feldman (1991) as ‘an assertion of identity and of symbolic capital’, and was observed by the young people in this study as a measure of self-protection:

Danny: It’s sort of like hear no evil, see no evil, out of sight out of mind, know what I mean - for the political situation, there is a lot of people who have very strong views and they just like to keep it to themselves sometimes, because you don’t know what sort of company you’re in along with. (ff1, 1999)

This silence and avoidance of political discussion or debate contributes to what Smyth (1996) names as ‘interpersonal segregation’, which, like other forms of segregation, can be important for community and personal safety. ‘Peace’ and tolerance is often only observed through a process of polite denial of aspects of identity and difference, or at least a process of identity management.

Where the sense of risk is perceived to be high, or the reasons for ‘crossing’ more essential to the person, the use of and need for protective strategies is deemed greatest. In such situations young people are clearly conscious of how they present themselves and how others perceive them. Sheila’s grandmother lives in an area that is predominantly Protestant. As a Catholic she is cautious about visiting her grandmother, whose home was petrol bombed the previous year:

Sheila: I be really worried. I do go and visit her (grandmother) but after last year I couldn’t wear my uniform any more, ‘cos do you know the Protestants from round the corner, they all live round there and whenever I was wearing my uniform, like, it’s a Catholic uniform ( ) like you can just recognise each other so I wear normal clothes. (ff2, 2000)

While Sheila perhaps crosses boundaries through a sense of family obligation, other young people traverse boundaries motivated, and in some ways protected, by hobbies and niche leisure interests. They employ precautionary strategies and are always aware of their position in relation to the space they occupy at any particular time, as discussed in detail in the two case studies below.

A leap of faith

Adele
Adele is a young woman who comes from a loyalist working class background. After leaving school, Adele enrolled on a college course and for the first time made friends from a Catholic background. Through them, she increased her access to the growing dance culture that was becoming established in the town, in post ceasefire times, but particularly alive in the nationalist part of town. Through this new social life she met a
young Catholic man and bravely brought him home to meet her family. He was not welcomed or trusted, and was regarded by her father and brother as a risk to her own and their safety.

While she scoffed at her parents’ disapproval of both her new friends and her involvement in a youth culture located in ‘hostile’ territory, she too was slow to trust and followed her own precautionary strategies:

INT: So you find it alright like to move around?

Adele: Aye. I don't tell anybody who I am until I get to know them, you know that kind of thing. Because my friend lives in K Road (in student area), if they ask me where I am from I go, ‘K Road’, and you get to know them and they open up more like. (ff1, 1999)

Despite her parents’ disapproval, and her own fears Adele continued to engage with the dance scene and to occupy spaces that were becoming increasingly linked to a globalised youth culture. In these spaces, Adele engaged with a new form of sociality that was less bound by the conventions observed by her parents’ generation. In pursuit of alternative experiences outside her closely knit and homogenous community, Adele rejected much of the social and cultural capital available within it, recognising that it would not necessarily help her to get where she wanted to go.

Adele, and others from similar backgrounds, are perhaps prepared to question the commitments to community cohesion, separateness and defence that their parents were not prepared or able to do. The growing dance scene, accessed initially through social networks developed in education and work spaces outside Adele’s local community, facilitated an identity and confidence beyond her locality. In making moves beyond her immediate locality and identity group, Adele purposefully, and successfully, accessed the benefits of bridging social capital. She made connections with like-minded people across groups through work, education and leisure. As an ambitious young woman she recognised that she needed to do this to get out to get on.

Studies documenting the rise and impact of the dance or rave scene in Britain on youth culture, highlight how it has become a medium for transcending boundaries of class and race, and how through it young people are becoming ‘key producers of contemporary culture’ (Smith and Maughan, 1998).

Allan

While boundary crossing is evidently easier for young women in Northern Ireland (McGrellis, 2002), the lure of the expanding club scene post cease-fires also holds an attraction for young men. Allan described how he sampled the nightlife in an area that was regarded as neither familiar nor safe. His strategy involved getting a safe passage guaranteed by a group of ‘the best fighters’ on the ‘other’ side:

Allan: I just decided to go over and see what it was like. It was on TV and all, that club housing [ ] It was a big DJ that was in it too, so I went in. It was great, a good old laugh. Because I know a wheen of boys from over the town and they said to me to come over. They said nothing will happen to you unless there’s more outside than what’s inside (they only guaranteed his safety inside the club). And one of the boys inside, the one I was with, he’s well known over the town, and he’s mates with a boy that’s been rated as one of the best fighters in the town – on the (perceived Catholic) side like. So I was happy enough when I went over with them, and everybody’s afraid of them boys so I was safe enough. At the start I didn't feel safe like. (ff1, 1999)
While Allan made tentative steps to sample the club scene in unfamiliar areas, he did so in such a way that not only ensured his safety while he was there, but also did not compromise his reputation or safety within his own community.

When we first met Allan he was 14 years old. He lived in a staunchly loyalist area bordering nationalist and republican communities. Living in such an area had implications for how he experienced space, how that space was defended and how he responded to it:

Allan: It's as if you're jammed into your own part of land. (Youth Values, 1998)

His friends supported loyalist paramilitary groups, defended their space fiercely, were involved in sectarian attacks on property and people, and over the years became increasingly involved in paramilitary activity. His parents were concerned about the company he kept and were worried he would become involved with the paramilitaries. They actively intervened to divert Allan onto another route. They took him out of the area to a seaside resort at times of high tension in the summer. They fostered and supported his interest in numerous sporting activities - paying for equipment and membership to clubs. They invested in these counter activities, recognising that these, even more so than education, would offer a saving resource:

Allan: Probably my parents would have influenced me. They taught me all about the paramilitaries and all, like say in case I wanted to join - but I wouldn't. They've took it out of my mind about joining the paramilitaries. They've got me into playing football. Some nights - say there’s revision - they still wouldn't care about the revision, they'd let me play football. [ ] they let me do all the sports and all - like my da paid £42.50 for a golf season ticket, then my ma paid £30 for a fishing licence. They said they don't care about the price if it keeps me off the streets, keeps me out of trouble.

INT: Are they worried also about the trouble? Are there strong pulls on you in other directions to get into trouble or to get involved in ...?

Allan: It's just my background and the people I hang about with are all bad influences. I do get into trouble a wile lot but my ma or da doesn't find out about it. (Youth Values, 1998)

Allan capitalised on resources made available to him at times of high risk, at critical moments (Thomson et al., 2002). His parents were influential in providing these resources and steering him to alternative organised leisure spaces outside of his locality. While Allan and his family had little in terms of economic or cultural capital to draw on they used the little they had to good advantage. They opted to invest in the leisure arena as opposed to education or work, for example, with immediate effect and long-term investment. Allan's story is a good example of how some young men have to make very deliberate and conscious efforts to avoid getting embroiled in sectarian violence and paramilitary activity, and in so doing sever links to some of their local networks.

While young people like Adele and Allan journey across territorial boundaries to access and contribute to the production of youth culture, they do so cautiously. Their journeys are perhaps more significant in the psychological and mental spaces traversed than the geographical spaces. However, the crossing of geographical and territorial boundaries continues to be regarded by young people as the most dangerous and demanding of, sometimes elaborate, protective strategies.

**Transcending the divide**

The biographical narratives of some young people suggest that leisure consumption is one area that is tentatively enabling young people, particularly young Protestant women, to move beyond the confines of their own confessional spaces. Such movement represents a challenge not only to them, but also to their...
parents and community of influence. Adele’s story above is an example of this. She is one of a number of young Protestant women from working class backgrounds who, over the course of the study, made tentative but significant journeys across religious and community divides in pursuit of leisure. For some this journey was made easier with the help of new friendships made through work and college. Relationships with young men from the ‘other side’ represented key moments for these young women in their narratives of place and identity (McGrellis, 2002; Thomson et al., 2003). Such challenges and opportunities are less readily available to or accessed by young men from similar working class backgrounds but are more easily pursued by young men from more middle class backgrounds. Music, dj-ing, sport, skateboarding, go-karting, art, and more, were all mediums used by young people, particularly by those from middle class backgrounds, to move across community boundaries. Access to and an ability to use networks, bridging social capital, can provide young people with safe passage within and between communities.

Patrick is a young Catholic man from a middle class background. He is steeped in social and cultural capital and uses it to good effect to move safely across boundaries. His interest in music and other leisure activities has given him a passport, and an alternative identity such as ‘wee Patrick the dj’ or the ‘skater’ to move across community divides. While Patrick and others like him leave behind their ethnic identities in order to cross community boundaries, others travel on the strength of theirs. Sunil and Naz are two young Asian men, from middle class backgrounds, who reported being accepted and welcomed in both communities. Being Asian they were able to move freely in both Catholic and Protestant areas, and had friends from both traditions:

Sunil: [ ] but with all my other friends, they just sometimes, because they’re both Catholics and Protestants, some don’t like going here, some don’t like going there but for me it’s alright. (Youth Values, 1998)

Naz: I have a lot of Catholic friends and a lot of Protestant friends. (Youth Values, 1998)

Belonging to neither one nor the other of the two main communities, these young men might be regarded as occupying a fragile shared space – a space that protects them from a sectarian gaze. They did not subscribe to protective strategies such as those described above, as they had no need to do so. They moved at will according to their social and leisure interests. Activity within this shared space is certainly limited. At a formal, institutional level this space houses the integrated education system and cross-community contact schemes.

5. Shared Spaces

Integrated education

Education has long been regarded in Northern Ireland as a means of getting out and getting on. Over the years the standard of educational achievement has equalled and surpassed that in the rest of the UK. Like so many other aspects of life in Northern Ireland, it too runs on segregated parallel tracks, with the majority of Protestants attending State-Controlled schools and the majority of Catholics attending Catholic-Maintained schools. Exponents on both sides vociferously guard the survival of both systems.

Integrated education developed as a community response to provide alternative choice to segregated education. The first integrated school opened in 1981, three more followed in 1985. Almost twenty years later fewer than 4% of the school age population attend one of 46 integrated schools across Northern Ireland.

The reported increase in racist attacks in Northern Ireland over the past few years suggests that the position of ethnic minority groups within this third space has become less secure (Jarman, 2003).
Ireland. Whether or not integrated education has had a significant effect in improving community relations between the two main communities is debated in the literature (Stringer, 2003; Smith, 1995). The range of methods and measures used to ascertain changes and effect make conclusive statements difficult. These criticisms also apply to assessment of contact schemes within schools (Department of Education Northern Ireland (DENI), 1999).

Young people across the study had their own views and thoughts on whether it made, or could make, a difference to the society in which they lived. Many of those on the outside looking in, from segregated schools, were sceptical. Some questioned how integrated schools could survive, even on a practical and cultural basis:

Liam: [ ] there’s no point I don’t think in integrating schools because there’s going to be arguments about the sports like, Catholics play Gaelic, hurling, and stuff like that, whereas Protestants play rugby and hockey and stuff like that. Like you can’t have what - say 7 or 8 sports running in one school ‘cos there wouldn’t be enough teachers to cover it. (Youth values, 1998)

Those who attended the integrated school (the majority of whom were from middle class backgrounds), made positive comments on their experience and how it gave them the opportunity to meet and make friends with their peers from other communities and backgrounds. Some however, felt that the system was not very effective in addressing issues around difference and division. The fundamental issues of identity and culture were, according to young men in one focus group, ‘glossed over’. The school, in their view, was cautious and fearful of increasing tension, and young people talked about the efforts made to suppress debate and political exchange. In an attempt to reduce the risk of conflict and intimidation on non-uniform days, pupils were not permitted to wear any emblems or clothing denoting ethnic identity or political or cultural allegiance. Avoiding the issues in this way was regarded by some as unrealistic:

INT: So does it (integrated school) kind of – integrate you?
Karin: There’s things like uniform free days, nobody’s allowed to wear football gear and you’re not allowed to wear things with labels in case it’s going to offend somebody, but if that’s your style, if that’s what you’re into, people should learn to have to accept that rather than be hidden away and like kinda brushed away ‘cos in the real world that doesn’t happen. (ff1, 1999)

While many gave positive feedback of their experience at the integrated school and of the friendships they developed there, many also believed that the ability of integrated schooling to address issues linked to identity and division was limited. The school was not part of a specific community, and its pupils were drawn from diverse and at times opposing communities. In social capital terms this lack of integration within communities could be seen as the reason why, as Carol states, such initiatives can ‘only go so far’:

Carol: I think integrated education can only go so far. Like fair enough this is an integrated school, everybody’s mixed and all but it’s in school from nine to four and it ends. Fair enough you can carry it on if you live in a mixed area, but there’s a lot of people here who don’t live in mixed areas and they go and they mix with these different religions and different races and they’re back to square one again. It’s just like, it’s like a part time job and then you go home and you’re just back and it’s all just like a joke. It’s not really, I dunno, I don’t know if it would work really. It depends. If you’re bitter, then you’re going to be bitter for the rest of your life. (Youth Values, 1998)

In the extract from Donovan and Carol’s discussion below, there is a very strong sense that integrated education exists unsupported and unconnected in a shared space. As such it is limited in its ability to generate and contribute to social relationship that could promote cohesion and reconciliation within the
broader society. As Carol indicates, the values and beliefs that young people respect come primarily from their homes and communities, rather than schools:

Donovan: And your home too will play a big part.  
INT: Is it stronger than the school?  
Donovan: Aye, for that's where you live and that's where you grow up, and the people around you there.  
Carol: It's the people who've taught you everything. That's where you believe - like all your beliefs come from there and those are the people you respect. You're not going to respect people you barely know, who just teach you in school. They're not going to change your beliefs. They can alter it like, and you can make new friends but I dunno – you tend to stick with your own crowd if you know what I mean.  
INT: Even if you come to an integrated school?  
Donovan: Aye. (Youth Values, 1998)

At ff4 almost 50% of our sample had left Northern Ireland, or were planning to leave soon, for further education or work. This trend is particularly pronounced among those who attended the integrated school. It could be the case that the integrated experience has whetted their appetite for greater cultural exposure and integration, and that the absence of a viable shared, real-life, mixed community space within Northern Ireland has encouraged them to look further afield for this experience:

Danny: Oh - types – people like that just make me wanna get out of this city as well or out of this country, 'cos it's full of them. [ ] It's one of the reasons I'm just glad to get out of (home town). ‘Cos you just don't get any of that in (English university city). Haven't known any of that. (ff3, 2001)

Young people use education as a means to move beyond the limits of sectarianism, at both individual and broader socio-political levels. For them, attending an integrated school facilitated such a move in a minor way – moving out of Northern Ireland represented a greater move towards a world beyond sectarianism and communities divided by religion. In a study of university students in Northern Ireland, Hargie, Dickson and Nelson (2003) found evidence of inter-group friendships but also of significant ‘consolidating patterns of in-group socialising’ and polite avoidance of ‘potentially divisive topics’. The university students in their study believed that they would have benefited from more inter-group contact in schools and communities prior to their university experience. Cross-community contact schemes have been happening on a fairly extensive scale for a number of years within schools and communities, but perhaps their long-term impact is not easily evaluated or felt by those who have taken part in them. The young people in this study had experience of these initiatives and their comments and evaluation of their experiences are included in the section below.

Cross-community initiatives

While only a small percentage of young people attend integrated education in Northern Ireland, significant numbers have had experience of Education for Mutual Understanding (EMU) – a compulsory part of the school curriculum and Cultural Heritage programmes. While actual face-to-face contact is not prescribed in EMU, many young people have met as part of this initiative. A significant number of young people have also been involved in single identity or cross-community contact schemes outside the school environment.

These schemes aim to increase cultural awareness, reduce prejudice and challenge stereotypes and attitudes held with regard to other ethnic groups. The ultimate aim is to move towards meaningful contact and reduce conflict. The success of inter-group contact schemes in Northern Ireland has been debated over the years. The Contact Hypotheses (Williams, 1947; Allport, 1954), on which such schemes are
based, has been criticised for its individualistic approach and lack of attention to the role of institutional, political and structural processes in division and conflict (Brown and Turner, 1981; Jackman and Crane, 1986). A review of this area by Connolly (1999) highlights these criticisms and raises some methodological and theoretical issues in respect of studies on contact schemes. Research into the effectiveness of such projects in Northern Ireland suggests that, while attitudes may change in the short term, a return to local communities often sees the return of previously held beliefs and attitudes (Cairns, 1987; Trew, 1989; Gallagher, 1989; Cairns and Cairns, 1995). Literature in this area also suggests that while contact between groups in such situations 'promotes interpersonal contact satisfactorily it does not necessarily promote inter-group contact' (Cairns, 1996).

Data from the *Youth values* and *Inventing adulthoods* projects support these findings, and suggests that young people themselves are aware that the influence of their community is stronger than what can often amount to no more than a short-lived contact experience. Families and communities exercise the most powerful influence in maintaining practices of resistance:

Liam: But not, you know, aye, starting from scratch and cross-community work. I know cross-community work has been done in the past and it's worked like, they've been taking them away for weekends and they've all got on grand, but when they go back into their own communities then, you know what I mean, they're listening to the same things, like say you're sitting in the house and your father sitting watching T.V., [saying] "and them fucking auld orange bastards", and all, you know they're hearing the same things and they're just going back to the way they were and they're forgetting about the work they done at the weekend.

INT: So how do you think you can continue, you know the work, building on whatever has been done when they're away on cross-community weekends

Julian: Take them away every weekend (laughs). (Youth Values, 1998)

The lack of naturally occurring safe spaces in which to follow up on friendships and contacts made on these cross-community schemes (generally rated positive in themselves by participants) means that many fail to realise their full potential or move to something more demanding, valuable and sustainable. Young people clearly found it difficult to pursue friendships made on such initiatives:

Dervla: Well in June there were 12 from my youth club and 12 from (Protestant youth club). We went away for three weeks together to Holland and we were taken in by families - they were a Protestant and Catholic each. And all of us got on well. We were together night and day so we had to - we had no choice.

INT: And do you keep contact with people that you met?

Dervla: Aye.

INT: So you're still friends with them?

Dervla: Mmm.

INT: And is it easy to meet up with them?

Dervla: Yeah. (.) It's not as easy as I thought it would be.

INT: Where do you go to meet up?

Dervla: We haven't met - I haven't met like, but if I see them up the town I would stand and chat to them but I wouldn't actually meet them here - in this estate.

Dermot: It would cause a fight like. If anybody found out I was going to meet a Protestant, there'd be a pile of wee boys with me like - wanting to fight with him. It would probably be the same with wee girls. (Youth Values, 1998)

A more sinister outcome of these experiences, according to some of the young men, is that the contact actually increases chances of being subjected to sectarian violence. Having been on a cross-community
initiative, young Catholics and Protestants are subsequently easily recognised as such and can become the target for sectarian assault:

Malcolm: It's obvious they want to, they want to fucking fight all the time that's all they want to do. The way I look at it they only come to the cross-community to find out who's who and stuff.
INT: And you say that's only one side or do you think it happens on the other side?
Malcolm: Aye people on the other side too, both sides are at it like, but it wouldn't concern me.
INT: Right so you try and keep out of it.
Malcolm: That's why I don't bother going to cross-community projects any more (ff4, 2003)

Photographs taken at school formals and published in the local newspapers apparently also increase chances of being recognised and targeted on the basis of perceived religious affiliation.

Such analysis of cross-community contact schemes is chilling, and reports suggesting that society is as segregated and polarised as ever highlight the uphill struggle for community relations and contact schemes (Carmichael and Hughes, 1998). In the light of such difficulties, community relations work has also been directed at the intra-community level, working within single communities to build confidence and cultural awareness. In the absence of sustained and meaningful cross-community follow-up, such initiatives could merely bolster the twin track mentality. In her recent analysis of this aspect of community relations work, Hughes warns of its potential danger to create “educated bigots” with the possibility of increasing hostility (Hughes, 2003). However, the demand for single identity projects highlights again the lack of trust between communities and the perceived lack of safe spaces in which to engage with one another.

Institutional and formal strategies such as integrated education, cross-community initiatives and contact schemes make important contributions to the development of positive community relations. However, their effectiveness is perhaps thwarted by the spaces they occupy, or more precisely the spaces they do not occupy. These initiatives often happen in isolated and unconnected spaces where social capital is less obviously available and sustaining. Some of the strategies young people are pursuing on their own are perhaps potentially as effective. Naturally occurring contact is clearly the most desirable and possibly more sustainable. It is not, however, without risk.

The night social scene is evidently one such informal arena. It has expanded significantly in Northern Ireland since the cease-fires, providing young people with increased opportunities to meet. Unfortunately a new form of violence has accompanied this more vibrant nightlife.

6. ‘Recreational Rioting’ and Urban Street Violence

In the aftermath of the cease-fires, it seemed that ‘non-sectarian’ street violence increased. More and more assaults were being reported in town and city centres across Northern Ireland. Public alarm and disquiet at this ‘new’ type of violence was significant. It seemed like a fear come true for those who expressed concern in the early days of the Troubles that exposure to political violence could herald a future increase in anti-social behaviour. Drugs, alcohol, and the cease-fires themselves were all mooted as possible causes. The familiarity of sectarian violence was perhaps associated with a sense of control and power for many and so other forms of violence were a continuation of this. Various initiatives, including CCTV, vigilante type groups, extra policing, and community restorative justice groups have all tried to deal with this increase in urban violence.

Over the course of the project, young people from all backgrounds, both males and females, increasingly talked about their fears and experiences of such random violent attacks. Little reference to this type of
violence was made in the earlier *Youth Values* study, although this could be a reflection of the age cohort rather than incidence level. This type of violence is unexpected and largely unpredictable, and as such more frightening, and controlling than the ‘organised riots’ that young people talked about. It also adds to the pressure on social space:

Lena: Two of my cousins themselves have got beatings you know, outside a bar in T street and all. You know, hit over the head and battered for no reason. The last one, my cousin was just walking home with his girlfriend and a fella, three fellas, just I don’t know they must, everybody says they must be on drugs or something but I don’t know, I think they’re just a bit crazy anyway to be able to do something like that. They probably maybe are on drugs as well, but he wasn’t doing anything, him and her were just walking home. (ff2, 2000)

Violence that can be labelled or named as sectarian is somehow more manageable and more easily justified or at least explained; the random violent attack, such as that described by the young woman above, and many others like her, is harder to box, does not follow any pattern, and is therefore more difficult to protect against. Young people discover that the strategies described above are not easily transferred to such situations.

Young people themselves looked for possible explanations and ways of making sense of the seemingly senseless, Lena, and others, considered drugs, alcohol, or just pure ‘craziness.’ Glen told about a friend of his who was randomly attacked in the city centre. He too talked about the town going ‘crazy’ but blamed the attacks on ‘hoods’. He felt he could at least identify them by their particular dress code and the way they talked, and in so identifying he could perhaps avoid crossing their paths and becoming a victim of their violence:

Glen: The Hoods, that’s what they call themselves, The Hoods. They wear tracksuits and hats sitting on top of their heads, it isn’t even on their heads, do you know what I mean. INT: Like base ball hats? Glen: Yes you see them about [ ] they talk like (in voice) ‘do you know what I mean’, that’s the way they talk and they’re either called Mickey, Paddy, Sheammy or Mackers. That’s what they’re called like. And they all just run about looking for excuses to start people in the slightest wee thing. And they’re everywhere you look. That’s the same over in (Protestant area) as well, exactly the same. Terrible. (ff2, 2000)

Drugs were frequently mentioned as a possible cause for such violence and since the ceasefires there has been a noted rise in the availability and use of drugs in Northern Ireland. Explanations put forward for this rise includes the reduced control of the paramilitaries on drug dealing, or conversely increased paramilitary involvement in drug dealing. The inter-relationship and shifting balance between sectarian or politically motivated violence and non-sectarian violence causes concern.

For many young people violence has become assumed in their social worlds and is eventually defined as such by both those involved in it and those observing from the outside. The term ‘recreational rioting’ (Jarman and O’Halloran, 2001) has been frequently used to describe what happens at interface flash points particularly throughout the summer months.

Kiera’s story is typical of so many in such areas. Her main social outlet was the street. Over the course of our meetings she became increasingly disaffected from school. She reported spending more and more time with an older group, hanging out, smoking and drinking. This social scene led to her involvement in inter-community rioting, which she described as ‘brilliant craic’ and as something that she ‘liked’ to do. She also told how two new friends from a loyalist area who were dating two local Catholic ‘fellas’ had also
become involved in the regular riot and were, as she put it, ‘throwing bottles at their own kind’. Violent conflict of this nature is undoubtedly more complex and perhaps more difficult to address than that purely motivated by sectarianism. The interaction between sectarian and ‘recreational’ violence poses further challenges for those involved in addressing violence in the community:

Kiera: Well this week, we’ve – there’s a crowd of ones from the other area cos they’re Protestants and you see they all came over where we hang about the other night and started throwing bottles and all so… on Monday night it – so there’s been a big row now every night since Monday night. They’re all meeting up and having this big fight and all, and trying to get them on their own and kicking the shit out of them. (ff2, 2000)

Unlike the ‘bad atmosphere’ generated by unpredictable city centre violence, the nature of the violence at the interface, such as that described by Kiera and others, is on a different level. It is more organised, contained and somehow familiar. Luke berated the media for its portrayal of such interface riots, when in fact he maintained that:

Luke: [ ] all it is is a crowd of Protestants here and a crowd of Catholics there, shout a couple of things, throw a couple of stones, the police come, get laid into them, go home, that’s about the height of it. (ff2, 2000)

7. The Future

The backdrop of sectarian and street violence clearly has an impact on how young people experience their lives on a day-to-day basis and affects their visions of the future. In the Youth values questionnaire (completed in 1998) young people were asked to list their hopes and fears for the future. The responses indicated that the ‘Troubles’ occupied a significant space in young people’s imagination. Irrespective of religion or gender, a significant proportion of the sample expressed a desire for peace in the future and were fearful of continued or increased violence. Those who lived in areas most affected by conflict expressed greatest fear of violence and conflict, and those from Protestant communities expressed greatest pessimism in relation to the political future and most fear about their position within that future. Focus group discussions at that time (1998) reflected these constructions of a contested and uncertain future.

In subsequent individual interviews in the Inventing adulthoods (ff) project, young people were asked at the end of each interview about their hopes and fears for the next 12 to 18 months. Given the discrete and relatively short time frame, hopes and fears expressed in this context were largely to do with current educational paths, current relationships, short term work plans, or health. A life line exercise used in the first Inventing adulthoods interview asked young people to consider what they would be doing in three years time, when they were 25 and then 35 years old. This exercise focussed on six specific areas: home/housing, education, work, relationships, travel/moving and values/priorities (see Thomson and Holland, 2004). None of these lines of enquiry accessed material similar to that generated by the hopes/fears question in the Youth values questionnaire. However, young people’s representation of their future within Northern Ireland and beyond, their views on the ‘peace process’ and how it affected their experience of life came up in the course of these interviews.

In all three rounds of the interviews in the Inventing adulthoods project only two young men admitted a keen interest in politics and the political process. A number expressed their frustration at the lack of progress and expressed their anger at politicians who were ‘corrupt’, power hungry, and were ‘all in it for
the money’. The overwhelming response to questions on the political situation over the years suggested that young people held little hope for a just and sustained peace:

INT: Do you feel hopeful as a young person, for your future in Northern Ireland?
Adele: I don’t think there is ever going to be peace, because you might have the IRA in an agreement, the UVF, but what about the LVF and the Real IRA? They are not going to hand in their guns because, at the end of the day, they don’t care that Catholics and Protestants, all they want is to fight, because you have boys in the LVF and they are killing Protestants because they took over their drug patch. So it’s got now to the stage that it’s not over Catholic or Protestant, it’s over power. That’s my feeling. (ff1, 1999)

Despite the increased activity and potential development in the political world, young people in the sample remained largely disaffected and disengaged:

INT: So what do you think about what is happening at the minute, in politics?
Matthew: (..) I don’t know really.
INT: Have you kind of switched off?
Matthew: I don’t know, I really don’t think it’s going to do much really, (..) you know the parliament, the government kind of thing. I don’t think that going to do really well much, but I would like to see the IRA decommissioning and that, you know with the bombs in Fermanagh, but I don’t think there will ever be peace like. (ff2, 2000)

The absence of obvious or tangible political progress or change in the short term seems to erode young people’s hope for the long-term future. Their disinterest in the political situation was evident and their views on the prospects for peace pessimistic:

INT: What about the political situation at the minute?
Anna: I don’t know nothing about it. I don’t want to know either.
INT: Mmm... why is that?
Anna: I just think they talk rubbish and they never say what, you know, they mean. They’re always on about peace but everybody knows it’s not going to happen. (ff2, 2000)

Round three interviews were carried out about 18 months later in 2001 and 2002. The Assembly was up and running but political enthusiasm among the group was far from hot. Malcolm advised that a month would be long enough for anyone to realise what it was like to live in Northern Ireland and that politics were stagnant:

Malcolm: Yeah. It sucks. You have to live here for about a month and then you’ll find out that it sucks. (ff3, 2001)

Views about the new political institutions were not overly positive, particularly among the young people from a Protestant background:

INT: Do you agree in principle with it (Northern Ireland Assembly) being set-up as a way forward for Northern Ireland?
Cheryl: No I don’t think it was, because all they do is fight. That’s all they ever seem to be doing, someone is ( ) everyday or something. I just think that they are in it for the money, because they all

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5 Northern Ireland Assembly is the devolved government body established as part of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement in 1999, was dissolved in April 2003 after suspension in October 2002.
got pay rises. They all give themselves huge pay rises, like, and they are not doing any more than what they were doing, so I think it's stupid in that sense. (ff3, 2001)

Young people reflected the dichotomous political positions prevalent within in Northern Ireland whereby political views or aspirations valued in one community are feared and rejected in the other. The seeming irreconcilable nature of these ideals leads to the pessimism expressed by so many young people in this study:

INT: And what do you think about the peace process at this stage in the game?
Malcolm: Disgrace.
INT: Disgrace?
Malcolm: There's never going to be peace is there because if there is a United Ireland the Protestant paramilitaries are just going to go out and start bombing and shooting.
INT: So are you hopeful at all about the future in that ...?
Malcolm: I hope there is peace but I can't see it happening.
INT: So at the minute, even though things would be not as bad as what they were, do you think that there's still ...?
Malcolm: Behind the scenes pretty bad. (ff3, 2001)

In the face of such pessimism it is perhaps not surprising that some young people imagine their future in spaces beyond Northern Ireland. As mentioned above almost half of this small but diverse sample have left or are planning to leave within the year. Of these two-thirds are Catholic, just over two-thirds are female, and over half are from a working class background. The main reason for leaving is to pursue third level education. (Across Northern Ireland just over 10% of school leavers 2001/2002 left to pursue further or higher education outside Northern Ireland (DENI Statistics and Research Branch, 2003):

Shannon: No, I still want to leave but I don't know where to. I don't consider anywhere as home, I mean I feel that this is more so home but I mean I don't see myself setting up a life here and actually being happy ( ) because there’s nothing here for anybody. I don’t think it will get better. (ff3, 2001)

While young people expressed a desire for a peaceful and just society, their investment in such a state has perhaps been dulled by their experience of violence and sectarianism, and what is perceived to be political intransigence. Comments such as those above highlight their lack of engagement with the political process, and suggest that more effort to empower young people within this process would be beneficial. Ownership of a working peace is particularly important to young people from working class backgrounds where the effects of violence and sectarianism have been felt most.

8. Summary and Conclusion

- Young people’s experience of violence and sectarianism in Northern Ireland continues to be affected by social class and gender.
- Young men from working class backgrounds are more likely than young women to be both victim and perpetrator of violence and sectarianism. However, the findings from this longitudinal study suggest that young people from all backgrounds are aware of and experience violence and sectarianism, to some degree.
- The level of perceived risk prompts the use of various strategies and tactics in an effort to manage or move beyond this risk. These strategies and tactics range from a developed ability to identify the ‘other’ and to hide one’s own identity in mixed or contested spaces, to extensive investment in leisure and
cultural activities. Some leave Northern Ireland for education or work and for some this is the ultimate escape strategy.

- The expansion of commercial and social life in towns and city centres across Northern Ireland in recent years has marked an increase in non-sectarian violence and as such has introduced a new and more insidious threat to young people, which is not as easily managed.
- The expansion of the nightlife has tentatively created an opportunity for some young people to act as social consumers in spaces previously avoided. From this study it seems that the ability to access social and cultural capital generated beyond immediate and local spaces, is more often the experience of young women, young people from a middle class background, and minority ethnic groups.
- Institutional efforts to address the effects of living in a divided society, in the shape of integrated education and cross community initiatives, have, according to the experience of young people in this project, valuable but limited effect. The lack of viable, naturally occurring shared spaces limit their potential.

Looking through the lens of social capital theory, it is perhaps easy to see how the existence of parallel social and cultural systems could frustrate broader community development, and in the case of Northern Ireland encourage continued ethnic conflict and distrust, and lead to tensions between groups and individuals. Within a divided society social capital is generated for the good of one’s own (sub)community, often to the exclusion of the other. Little attention or energy is devoted to the development of a viable shared space. Because of the limited investment and belief in such a space, initiatives that happen or are consigned here (e.g. contact schemes, integrated education) can struggle and can be slow to generate their own social and cultural capital.

The existence of a parallel community system leads to a continual analysis, on many levels, as to one’s position in relation to the ‘other’ at any point in time. This analysis is continually evident in the political arena where perceived advances on one side are assumed as losses on the other side. Such analysis also forms part of young people’s daily living and consciousness. While popular youth culture has allowed young people to make tentative steps across boundaries, they do so armed with their own defensive and protective strategies, in the belief that even leisure spaces ‘belong’ to one side or the other, and that resources and investment on one side must mean unfair disadvantage to the other.

In negotiating spaces that are so divided, young people call on tactics and strategies devised for the purposes of ‘identity management’ and personal safety. ‘Tactics’ born out of defensiveness can reproduce and reinforce sectarianism, can perpetuate fear and distrust and preserve a culture of separateness and resistance. Some young people employ what could be called ‘strategies,’ enabling them to both manage and move beyond the circumstances they find themselves in.

Findings from this study suggest that much of contact that young people are interested in and learn from, and indeed initiate themselves, is driven by consumption and leisure. The strategies they use to enable this contact pay less attention to knowledge of cultural and ethnic difference than they do to processes of globalisation and alternative but shared identities. According to Coleman, this investment in a youth culture that revolves around generation-specific leisure activities and is dominated by a youth-oriented mass media undermines the generation of (bonding) social capital, and leads ‘youth away from parent-generated norms and from school-imposed goals’ (Coleman, 1991). However, as outlined in this paper the connections young people in Northern Ireland make through social and leisure worlds can have a potentially positive effect in building cross community networks.

The presence of overt and institutional racism (Connolly, 2002) and recent increase in racist attacks in Northern Ireland (Jarman, 2003) could be regarded as an extension of the sectarianism that is embedded within the society, as described and experienced by the young people in this study. It underlines the need
for a coherent strategy to tackle violence and assaults directed against individuals and communities who are regarded as different on the basis of their faith, cultural or ethnic background. The promotion of and investment in identities tied into cultural, social and leisure worlds will be vital for the development of a shared future and shared spaces 'where people are encouraged to make choices in their lives that are not bound by historical divisions' (Community Relations Unit, 2003).
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